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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
ner is that Congress recognized that
creditors' rights are unfairly jeopardized whenever a debtor whose assets are not sufficient to pay liabilities
disposes of property for less than fair
consideration, regardless of the
debtor's motive. Consistent with this
policy, "fair consideration" was defined in the former Act as something
more than the consideration necessary to make a simple contract
enforceable. Section 67(d)(l)(e) provided as follows:

INDIRECT ECONOMIC BENEFIT
AS FAIR CONSIDERATION IN
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
CASES

The roots of the law of fraudulent
conveyances can be traced back to the
Statute of Elizabeth, an early English
statute enacted in 1570 "[f]or the
avoiding and abolishing of feigned,
covinous and fraudulent ... conveyances ... [which] have been and are
devised ... to the end, purpose and
intent, to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors .... " 1
The former Bankruptcy Act refined the concept of fraudulent conveyances by defining it to include
constructive fraud. More particularly, Section 67(d) of the Act provided that "[e]very transfer made and
every obligation incurred by a debtor
within one year prior to the filing of
a petition initiating a proceeding
under this Act by or against him is
fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing
at the time of such transfer or obligation, if made or incurred without
fair consideration by a debtor who is
or will be thereby rendered insolvent,
without regard to his actual intent. . . . '' 2 The reason for defining
a fraudulent conveyance in this man-

[C]onsideration given for the property
or obligation of a debtor is "fair" (l)
when, in good faith, in exchange and
as a fair equivalent therefor, property
is transferred or an antecedent debt is
satisfied, or (2) when such property or
obligation is received in good faith to
secure a present advance or antecedent debt in an amount not disproportionately small as compared
with the value of the property or obligation obtained.

The increase in corporate affiliations and multitiered corporations in
modem commercial society has resulted in more three-sided credit
transactions involving intercorporate
guarantees. These situations present
special difficulties in applying the
"fair consideration" standard, especially when an insolvent entity
guarantees and secures the debt of a
separate but affiliated corporation. A
recent case, Rubin v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Company,; explores

* Counsel to the Jaw firm of Levin &
Weintraub, New York City; member of the
National Bankruptcy Conference.
** Professor of Law, Hofstra University
School of Law, Hempstead, New York.
1
Stat. 13 Eliz. c.5 (1570).
2
Former Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2) (emphasis added).

'661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981).
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this problem. Although it was decided under the provisions of the
former Act, Rubin should remain as
persuasive authority under the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.

the check cashers in their principal
business by reducing the cash outlays
associated with it. ''This symbiotic
relationship with the check casher
sales agents was vital to the money
order issuers." 5
As business developed, Trent/
Skowron expanded into the checkcashing business by forming Empire
Small Business Investment Corporation (Empire) which they used as
a holding company to acquire a controlling interest in National Payroll
Services Ltd. (National), itself a
holding company that owned eleven
check-cashing corporations, and to
acquire a controlling interest in TWO
Check Cashing Corp. (TWO), another holding company that owned
four check-cashing firms.
The complexity of this system was
illustrated by a chart with which the
court summarized the relationships of
the various affiliates6 :
Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Company (the Bank) was the principal banker for this network of affiliates and made various loans to
several of the above entities as well as
independent check-cashing establishments which issued UMO and USN
money orders.
Financial problems existing in the
check-cashing and money order businesses quickly resulted in the former
as sales agents for USN and UMO
experienced a constant need for cash,
which could not be wholly satisfied
from a sale of the money orders.
There was a danger that the check

Rubin v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co.
The complex fact pattern in Rubin
involved "a sort of private banking
empire" 4 controlled by two individuals, John M. Trent and Eugene
Skowron (Trent/Skowron). The companies controlled by Trent/Skowron
provided banking-type services primarily to lower-income persons who
did not maintain ordinary checking
accounts. As part of the system,
U.S.N. Co., Inc. (USN) and Universal Money Order Co., Inc. (UMO),
two affiliated companies; were in the
business of issuing money orders.
Both USN and UMO were owned entirely by International Express Company (International), which was a
holding company controlled by
Trent/Skowron.
USN and UMO did not sell their
money orders directly to the public.
Althdugh the money orders were sold
through a variety of retail stores, the
firms 'principal sales agents were a
number of check-cashing establishments located in large cities. These
check-cashing services provided customers with the cash needed to buy
the bankrupts' money orders. Similarly, the sale of money orders aided

5
4

/d. at 982.

"Id.

/d. at 981.
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Trent/Skowron
(stockholders)

International
(holding company)

A

USN
(issuer)
(100%)

~

UMO
(issuer)
(100%)

Empire
(holding company)

~

National
(holding company)
(50%)

TWO
(holding company)
(33.3%)

check casher
subsidiaries
(100%)

check casher
subsidiaries
(100%)

Numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of the stock of the cor-]
po~ation

owned by the entity immediately above it in the chain of owner-

ship.

tances of sales proceeds to the issuer
necessarily diminishes the 'float',
and therefore the profitability of the
issuers' business." 7 Indeed, as the
district court has found, "the importance of the float to USN and
UMO can be seen in the precipitous
collapse that followed the loss, in
January 1977, of one day's float." 8
In an effort to resolve these problems, Trent/Skowron arranged in
1964 for financing for the checkcashing firms with the Bank where

cashers would run out of currency
which would mean an inability to
conduct the principal business. Moreover, if the cashers became unable to
cash checks, then many prospective
customers of UMO and USN would
be unable to obtain the cash needed to
purchase money orders. Additionally, other problems concerned the
money issuers: the check casher's
temptation "to retain the proceeds of
his money order sales for use in his
own business rather than remit them
promptly to the issuer. Such footdragging could have disastrous consequences for the issuer, whose profit
depends largely on his freedom to exploit the 'float' inherent in his business . . . . Any delay in the remit-

7
/d. at 982-983. The "float" enabled the
use and investment of proceeds of money
orders sales between the time of purchase and
the time when the money orders were
presented for collection.
• /d. at 983 n. 7.
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USN maintained an account. "This
three-sided financing arrangement
whereby MHT [the Bank] loaned
money to the check cas hers [about
thirteen entities in the aggregate] according to the schedules submitted by
Trent and Skowron, remained an essential operating procedure until the
Trent/Skowron network collapsed in
January 1977." 9
Although the original loan line to
the check cashers started out on the
basis of the check cashers' own
credit, a supplementary line of credit
was arranged by Trent/Skowron in
1966 for the check cashers. Under the
latter arrangement, Trent/Skowron
pledged certain securities, owned by
them, as collateral and the Bank extended credit to the cashers, in accordance with monthly schedules submitted by Trent/Skowron in a
total amount that was fixed as a varying m\lltiple of the value of the collateral. These schedules requested
loans to each check casher for each
day of the month, based on each
cashers' estimated varying daily
needs. The Bank would review the
schedules and extend the specified
credit. In sum, under the initial line
of credit provided for the check cashers by the Bank, they were able to
borrow on their own credit. On the
supplementary line, the cashers were
able to draw on the strength of the
Trent/Skowron collateral as necessary to meet the peak demands of
their business. In any case, the repayment of all of these loans was
primarily the responsibility of the
check cashers.
In 1970, Trent/Skowron executed
a series of agreements with the Bank

whereby they guaranteed the debts of
the check cashers to the Bank, gave
the Bank a lien on their accounts, and
pledged other property to secure advances made to the check cashers.
"Under the 1970 guarantee, the
check cashers' loan lines were no
longer tied to their own creditworthiness, but were predicated entirely on the financial strength of
Trent and Skowron." 10
Subsequently, the Bank obtained a
series of guarantees and crossguarantees "from various entities in
the network in order to ensure that it
would be able to look to the assets of
any of the Trent/Skowron entities in
the event of a default by the check
cashers." 11 Under each guarantee
agreement, the guarantor granted the
Bank a security interest on certain of
its assets. In 1972, USN granted the
Bank a security interest in all its
money, securities, and other property
then or thereafter in the Bank's possession to secure USN's guarantee of
the debts of Trent/Skowron and
UMO. In addition, UMO executed a
guarantee of Trent/Skowron' s debts
and granted the Bank a similar broad
lien. In 1976, along with additional
guarantees of the debts of Trent/
Skowron, UMO pledged a $187,000
certificate of deposit as well as other
collateral.
After the execution of these guarantees, the number of check cashers
financed under the Trent/Skowron
loan lines increased. At their peak,
the check cashers' borrowings from
the bank totaled approximately $12
million and were secured by $3 mil-

• Id. at 983.
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lion worth of collateral under the
guarantees.
In 1976, the Trent/Skowron enterprise experienced problems with remitting moneys for sales of food
stamps and again the Bank came to
the rescue by making an additional
$500,000 in credit available to National and TWO, which used the
funds to settle the food stamp accounts of their check casher subsidiaries. Under the cross-guarantees,
the affiliated corporations, including
USN and UMO, were liable for the
increased loan line debts of National
and TWO.
There followed an examination of
the books of UMO by the California
Banking Department which resulted
in a finding that UMO had a negative
net worth. The downhill trend continued with the New York State
Banking Department ordering USN
to discontinue the sale of money orders. UMO, unable to redeem $5.3
million worth of outstanding money
orders, filed a Chapter XI petition on
January 12, 1977, and was eventually
adjudicated a bankrupt. On January
20, 1977, USN filed a petition in
bankruptcy and announced that it
could not redeem $5 million of outstanding money orders.
Prior to the filings and on January
11 , 1977, the Bank set off the funds
in checking accounts of USN and
UMO in the sum of $295,000 and
$80,000 respectively and applied
them against loans aggregating $1.55
million. Subsequently, pursuant to a
stipulation with the trustee, the Bank
sold the various securities pledged by
UMO for $1.387 million under the
1976 guarantee of the debts of
Trent/Skowron. The moneys were

applied to loans due from several of
the Trent/Skowron check cashers and
the excess balance of the sales proceeds were paid to UMO's trustee. In
the aggregate, a total of $1.489 million worth of bank deposits and securities owned by UMO and USN and
used as collateral was seized and retained by the Bank to repay loans advanced to check-cashing firms in the
Trent/Skowron network.
The bankruptcy trustees of USN
and UMO instituted actions against
the Bank to recover the sum of
$1.489 million for the benefit of the
bankrupts' creditors, comprised principally of holders of unredeemed
money orders. The theory of the actions was that the USN and UMO
guarantees and grants of liens to secure debts of other entities in the
Trent/Skowron network constituted
fraudulent conveyances pursuant to
Section 67(d) of the former Bankruptcy Act. In order to prevail, "the
trustees were required to show: ( 1)
that USN and UMO made transfers or
incurred obligations to MHT within
one year of the January 1977 filings
of their bankruptcy petitions, (2) that
these transactions were entered into
without ''fair'' consideration to USN
and UMO, and (3) that the bankrupts
were, or were rendered, insolvent or
insufficiently capitalized as a result. 12

The Timing of the Transactions
Although the question of the timing of the transactions could have
been avoided by applying the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act,
adopted in the Debtor and Creditor
12

79
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Law of New York, 13 which would
have allowed the trustees to avoid
fraudulent transfers occurring prior to
the one-year period set forth in Section 67(d), the court of appeals held
that the obligations incurred and
transfers made by the bankrupts occurred when the check cashers drew
on the loan credit lines, not when the
guarantees and security agreements
were first executed. "Until the loans
were made, there existed only a
framework through which USN and
UMO might incur obligations, but
they had not done so yet. '' 14 Because
loans were made within the one-year
prebankruptcy period, Section 67(d)
did apply.

Was Ther~ "Fair" Consideration?
The trustee's position was that
USN and UMO incurred obligations
under their fair guarantees and
granted security interests in their assets for advances made not to themselves, but to other and separate entities in the Trent/Skowron network.
The trustees argued that no benefit
was received by USN and UMO and,
accordingly, they did not receive fair
consideration. On the other hand, the
Bank argued that the loans to the
check-cashing firms did benefit USN
and UMO indirectly. The loans enabled check cashers to settle their accounts with ·USN and UMO more
quickly, thereby increasing both the
pool of funds available to redeem
money orders and the "float" from
which profits were derived. Cer-

tainly, providing sufficient cash for
the check cashers to stay in business
maintained the stream of money order sales proceeds needed by USN
and UMO. Such economic benefit,
according to the Bank, constituted
fair consideration. The district
court agreed with the Bank's position. Basing its decision on a finding
that there was an "identity of interest" IS between. USN, UMO, National, and TWO, the indirect economic benefit enjoyed by the
bankrupts by reason of loans to the
check cashers amounted to fair consideration. In analyzing this issue,
the district court characterized the
Trent/Skowron enterprises as "one
ball of wax" 16 despite the barriers of
corporate form.
In reversing the district court's
holding on the fair consideration issue, the court of appeals rejected both
the trustees' and the Bank's positions. The trustees' position, based
on the proposition that the debtor receives no consideration when a loan
is made to a third party, was too
narrow for the court. After citing
cases which held that the transfer of
property for the benefit of a third
party does not constitute fair consideration, 17 the court stated:
The cases recognize, however, that a
debtor may sometimes receive "fair"
consideration even though the consideration given for his property or obli" ld. at 992.
16
!d. at 988.
17
The court cited In re Christian & Porter
Aluminum Co., 584 F.2d 326, 337 (9th Cir.
1978); Bennett v. Rodman & English, Inc., 2
F. Supp. 355 (E.D.N. Y.), aff d per curiam 62
F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1932). See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., note 3 supra. at
991.

13
N.Y. Debtor-Creditor Law Art. 10
(McKinney's).
14
Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., note 3 supra, at 990.
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gation goes initially to a third person .... If the consideration given to
the third person has ultimately landed
in the debtor's hands, or if the giving
of the consideration to the third person otherwise confers an economic
benefit upon the debtor, then the
debtor's net worth has been preserved
and §67(d) has been satisfiedprovided, of course, that the value of
the benefit received by the debtor approximates the value of the property
or obligation he has given up. For
example . . . an individual debtor's
repayment of loans made to a corporation, where the corporation has
served merely as a conduit .... Similarly, fair consideration will often exist for a novation, where the debtor's
discharge of a third person's debt also
discharges his own debt to that third
person . . . and it may sometimes be
found in multi-party transactions of
greater intricacy. . . .1s

not compel a finding of no fair consideration for USN and UMO's guarantees and security agreements.
On the other hand, the Bank's position that "the existence of any indirect benefit whatever to USN and
UMO from the advances . . . meant
that the issuers' obligations as guarantors were necessarily supported by
fair consideration,'' 20 was also too
extreme. In a transfer for security,
Section 67(d)(i)(e) requires that the
advance be ''not disproportionately
small as compared with the value of
the property or obligation" given by
the bankrupt to secure it. However, in
a three-sided transaction "it is not
enough merely to compare the absolute amount of the third person's debt
with the amount of security given by
the bankrupt." 21 The trustees' burden of proving lack of fair consideration could be established ''by
proving that the value of what the
bankrupt actually received was
disproportionately small compared to
the value of what it gave. Accordingly, the court must attempt to measure the economic benefit, if any, that
accrued to each bankrupt as a result
of the third person's indebtedness,
and it must then determine whether
that benefit was 'disproportionately
small' when compared to the size of
the security that that bankrupt gave
and the obligations it incurred." 22
The district court failed to make
such an analysis. Although it held
generally that USN and UMO had a
vital interest in having the Bank make
the loans, "it did not attempt to quantify the indirect benefits to either

The court's rationale was as follows:
In each of these situations, the net
effect of the transaction on the
debtor's estate is demonstrably insignificant, for he has received albeit indirectly, either an asset or a discharge
of a debt worth approximately as
much as the property he has given up
or the obligation incurred. Thus, although these indirect benefit cases
frequently speak as though an "identity of [economic] interest" between
the debtor and the third person sufficed to establish fair consideration . .
. the decisions in fact tum on the
statutory purpose of conserving the
debtor's estate for the benefit of
creditors. 19

Accordingly, the mere fact that the
check cashers, rather than USN and
UMO, received the loan advances did
18
/d. at 991-992 (emphasis added and
citations omitted).
19
!d. at 992 (citations omitted).

20
21
22
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issuer or to compare those benefits
with the obligations assumed by the
issuers under the guarantees." 23 The
court then set forth a detailed inquiry
to be followed by the trial court on
remand. In essence, the district court
must determine the extent to which
the loans increased remittances from
the check-cashing firms to USN and
UMO.
The court must then compare its estimate of the value thus received by
each issuer with the magnitude of the
obligation charged· against that issuer
under its guarantee. If the value received by either issuer is found to be
disproportionately small as compared
with its obligation, then, to that extent, the trustee for that issuer will
have proved lack of fair consideration, and the court must proceed to
consider the insolvency issue, discussed below. However, if either
trustee fails to establish that the value
is disproportionately small, the court
must rule for [the Bank] against that
trustee. 24

The court of appeals was quick to
add, however, that in making such
determinations, the trial court "need
not strive for mathematical precision.
Section 67(d) requires only 'fair'
consideration, not a penny-for-penny
exchange. " 25

and transfers made without fair consideration. An entity is insolvent
within the meaning of Section 67(d)
''when the present fair salable value
of his property is less than the amount
required to pay his debts." 26
First, the district court placed too
much emphasis on the financial
health of the Trent/Skowron network
as a whole when it found that UMO
was solvent. Corporate lines must be
respected and, therefore, "the insolvency issue hinges on the financial
position of the debtor, not on that of
related entities.'' 27
The second error made by the district court was in placing undue emphasis on book value of the debtors'
assets. The proper approach is to determine market value of assets, which
may differ significantly from its book
value. Finally, the district court's focus on the time of the transactions as
being the time when guarantees were
executed, as opposed to when loans
were advanced, tainted any finding
with respect to the debtors' insolvency at the time of the alleged
fraudulent obligation or transfer.
The Bankruptcy Code
The Rubin decision should remain
as the persuasive authority in threesided transactions involving guarantees of debts incurred by affiliated
corporations when such transactions
are chahenged in cases governed by
the Bankruptcy Code. 28 There are two
reasons for such applicability.

Insolvency of USN and UMO
The court of appeals also held that
the district court erred in holding that
the bankruptcy trustees failed to
prove that USN and UMO were insolvent at the time of the obligations

26

Former Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(l)(d).
Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., note 3 supra, at 995.
2
' 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. The Bankruptcy
Code governs all bankruptcy cases commenced on or after October I, 1979.
27

ld.
,. /d. at 994.
2S ld.

23
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First, challenges by trustees are
often made under state fraudulent
conveyance legislation. In many
states, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is controlling and is
available to trustees by reason of Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 29
It is that section which gives the
trustee the power to avoid transfers
and obligations that are voidable under state law by a creditor holding an
unsecured claim. Moreover, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is
almost identical to Section 67(d) of
the former Bankruptcy Act and uses
the same concept and definition of
•'fair consideration.''
Second, Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code governing fraudulent
transfers and obligations is similar to
Section 67(d) of the former Act, al-

though different terminology is used.
Instead of using the term ''fair consideration," the Code provides that a
transfer or obligation is fraudulent if
the debtor "received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer of obligation." 30
Although it could be argued that the
standard of "reasonably equivalent
value"is stricter than the Act's standarc1 of "an amount not disproportionately small as compared with
the value of the property or obligation
obtained," a quantitative analysis set
forth in Rubin is still necessary to
weigh the indirect economic benefit
received by the debtor in bankruptcy
when it guarantees or secures credit
advances to a separate but affiliated
entjty.
30

29

ded).

II U.S.C. § 544(b).
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